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With the help of a simple quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme, we discuss the relation
between BB84-type protocols and two-step-type ones. It is shown that they have the same essence,
i.e., information-splitting. More specifically, the similarity between them includes (1) the carrier
state is split into two parts which will be sent one by one; (2) the possible states of each quantum
part are indistinguishable; (3) anyone who obtains both parts can recover the initial carrier state
and then distinguish it from several possible states. This result is useful for related scheme designing
and security analyzing.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.-w
The goal of cryptography is to ensure that a secret
message is transmitted between two users, traditionally
called Alice and Bob, in a way that any eavesdropper
(such as Eve) cannot read it. Till now, it is generally
accepted that the only proven secure cryptosystem is
the scheme of one-time pad, which utilizes a previously
shared secret key to encrypt the message transmitted in
the public channel. However, it is difficult for all existing
classical cryptosystems to establish a random key with
unconditional security between Alice and Bob. Fortu-
nately, quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20], the
approach using quantum mechanics principles for the dis-
tribution of secret key, can accomplish this task skillfully.
The first QKD scheme, i.e., BB84 protocol, was pro-
posed in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard [1]. Here we give
a brief introduction of a well-known variation of it, i.e.,
the delayed choice BB84 protocol. In this scheme Alice
randomly generates single photons polarized along one of
four possible directions, 0◦, 45◦, 90◦ or 135◦, and sends
them to Bob. Note that these four states form two conju-
gate bases {0◦, 90◦} and {45◦, 135◦}. After Bob received
these photons, Alice tells Bob which basis she used for
each one. Afterwards, Bob measures every photon in the
same basis as that of Alice and it follows that he can
know what states Alice sent from the measurement re-
sults. As the different states can be encoded into 0 and
1, Alice and Bob will share a sequence of key bits. Eve’s
presence can be detected by publicly comparing a subse-
quence of these bits. Obviously, Eve cannot elicit correct
information without introducing errors because she does
not know, when these photons are transmitted in the
quantum channel, which of the two conjugate bases was
used to prepare each of them. If Eve tries to measure one
certain photon to acquire information, she will bring dis-
turbance once she uses a wrong basis (the announcement
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of bases from Alice is too late for Eve). Nevertheless
Bob will obtain all of the key bits (noise is not concerned
here) sent by Alice because he can perform his measure-
ment after Alice’s announcement. Several other schemes
utilize similar means to distribute key (for example, see
Refs.[3, 8]). We customarily call them BB84-type pro-
tocols. The main feature of these protocols is that the
communicators use nonorthogonal states so that Eve can-
not distinguish them completely, on which the security is
based.
Since Goldenberg and Vaidman came up with a QKD
protocol based on orthogonal states in 1995 [5], much at-
tention has been focused on this type of quantum cryp-
tography [7, 12, 13, 21]. In these schemes the information
carrier is composed of a set of orthogonal states. As we
know, orthogonal states can be easily distinguished with
no disturbance and, therefore, as the carrier, they cannot
be transmitted in the public quantum channel directly.
The above proposals give a smart resolvent, that is, split-
ting the information unit, which denotes the information
encoded in one complete unit of carrier, into two parts,
e.g., the two parts of a photon wave packet [5, 7] or two
correlated particles [12, 13, 21], and sending them one
by one (see Fig. 1). Note that one can never read the
total information transmitted without introducing dis-
turbance by measuring only one of the two parts. In
this condition, Eve cannot access the two parts simulta-
neously and it follows that her eavesdropping is doomed
to failure. In this Letter we ignore the case that Eve in-
tercepts legal wave packets (or particles) and sends some
fake ones to Bob, where Eve will introduce errors though
she can obtain both two parts at the same time. Because
the information unit is always transmitted by two steps,
we call this type of schemes two-step-type protocols.
In this Letter we focus our attention on the relation
between BB84-type protocols and two-step-type ones. In
fact, Peres and the authors of Ref.[5] discussed the similar
topic long time ago, but they did not make an agreement
about it [22, 23]. As far as the great influence of both
types of QKD on quantum cryptography is concerned,
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FIG. 1: The QKD model of two-step-type protocols. In these
protocols Alice splits the complete information (carried by
orthogonal states) into two quantum parts and sends them
one by one. That is, they never appear simultaneously in
the insecure channel, which can be achieved by using storage
rings SR1. At the destination, with the help of storage rings
SR2, Bob can recover the complete information after both
two parts arrived. In fact, BB84-type protocols can also be
depicted by this model. In this condition the lower channel is
a classical channel instead of a quantum one. See the following
paragraphs for details.
it is of importance to clear up their connection further.
We consider these two types of QKD are based on the
same essence, i.e., information splitting. To demonstrate
our viewpoint, we will introduce another QKD scheme,
called the mid protocol, and compare it with the above
two types of QKD respectively, which is similar to the
way employed by Bennett et al. [24] when they analyzed
the connection between BB84 protocol and E91 protocol
[2].
To begin with, let us examine what results Alice ob-
tains after the information-splitting operation on the car-
rier in two-step-type protocols. In Ref.[5] (Ref.[7]), with
the help of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer, the informa-
tion unit is split into two wave packets which have aver-
age (different) amplitudes. In Refs.[12, 13, 21], alterna-
tively, the information carrier is in a two-particle state
and it is divided into two single particles directly. It can
be seen that, no matter how it is split, both the two
parts obtained are quantum ones in previous schemes.
Now we consider a special way to split, i.e., splitting the
information unit into one quantum part and one classical
part. A simple instance (i.e., the mid protocol) proceeds
as follows (also see Fig. 1).
(i) Alice generates a sequence of Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) pairs (a1, b1), (a2, b2), ..., (am, bm), where
(ai, bi) denotes one EPR pair (1 ≤ i ≤ m, m > 0 is
an integer) and each pair is randomly in one of four
Bell states, i.e., |Φ±〉 = 1/√2(|00〉 ± |11〉) and |Ψ±〉 =
1/
√
2(|01〉 ± |10〉). Suppose |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, and |Ψ−〉
represent bit values 00, 01, 10, and 11, respectively.
(ii) Alice splits each information unit into a quantum
part and a classical part. Here Alice takes every two
adjoining pairs as a complete carrier unit. Without loss
of generality, consider the first carrier unit [a1, b1, a2, b2].
The information-splitting operation can be described as
follows. Alice performs, at random, one of the following
two operations on the carrier unit: (1) doing nothing; (2)
exchanging the positions of particles b1 and a2, that is,
rearranging [a1, b1, a2, b2] into [a1, a2, b1, b2], which can be
easily realized by storage rings. After that these particles
form the quantum part. While the classical part is 0 or
1, corresponding to the operation (1) or (2) respectively.
(iii) Alice sends the two parts to Bob by two steps as
in the previous two-step-type protocols. More concretely,
the quantum part is sent firstly and then the classical part
follows. The delayed time is brought by the storage rings
SR1. That is, when the quantum part is transmitted in
the upper channel, the classical part is still in SR1. At
the same time, the quantum part is already in SR2 when
the classical part is transmitted in the lower channel. As
a result, Eve cannot access both parts simultaneously.
(iv) When Bob have received both the two parts, he
combines them and tries to recover the complete infor-
mation. If the classical part is 1, Bob exchanges the po-
sitions of the second and the third particles. Otherwise
he does nothing.
(v) Bob measures this carrier unit to obtain the key.
Bob performs two Bell measurements on the first two par-
ticles and the rest two particles. As a result, he can get
four bits of key from his measurement result (according
to the above coding rule).
In the above description, for simplicity, we only con-
sidered the first carrier unit, i.e., the first two EPR pairs.
The other EPR pairs generated by Alice can be used in
a similar way. At last, Alice and Bob publicly compare a
subsequence of the bits sent by Alice with those received
by Bob to detect Eve’s presence. If there is no eaves-
dropping Alice and Bob will obtain a sequence of secure
key after error correction and privacy amplification [15].
The operation of order rearrangement is inspired by the
work of Deng and Long [25]. It should be emphasized
that our main aim is using our scheme to discuss the
relation between BB84-type protocols and two-step-type
ones instead of the QKD scheme itself.
It can be seen that the mid protocol possesses the same
features of two-step-type protocols such as using orthog-
onal states as carrier, splitting the information unit into
two parts and sending them one by one, etc. The only
difference between the mid protocol and two-step-type
protocols is that the former splits the information unit
into a quantum part and a classical one, while the latter
splits it into two quantum parts. From this perspective,
the mid protocol is a variation of two-step-type protocols.
Now let us observe the relation between the mid pro-
tocol and BB84-type protocols. Obviously, if we inter-
pret the delayed time as the effect of storage rings, the
delayed choice BB84-type protocols can be depicted by
Fig. 1, too. Equivalently, Alice sends the photons to
Bob through the upper channel and, after Bob has re-
ceived them, tells Bob the classical bits (i.e., the bases
information) through the lower channel. Therefore, the
mid protocol and BB84-type protocols have very similar
feature. Intuitively, the only difference between them is
that the mid protocol uses orthogonal states as carrier
while BB84-type protocols are based on nonorthogonal
3states. However, it is just a superficial phenomenon. In
fact, if we consider a certain complete carrier unit such as
[a1, b1, a2, b2] in the mid protocol, its possible states (i.e.,
the two possible states after Alice’s information-splitting
operation) are nonorthogonal indeed. For example, sup-
pose both the two EPR pairs are in state of |Φ+〉, that
is, |ϕ〉a1b1 = |ϕ〉a2b2 = |Φ+〉. In this condition the state
of this carrier unit can be written as
|ϕ〉a1b1a2b2 = |Φ+〉 ⊗ |Φ+〉 (1)
=
1
2
(|0000〉+ |0011〉+ |1100〉+ |1111〉).
After Alice’s information-splitting operation, this car-
rier unit will be changed into one of two possible states
|ϕ〉a1b1a2b2 and |ϕ〉a1a2b1b2 , where
|ϕ〉a1a2b1b2 =
1
2
(|0000〉+ |0101〉+ |1010〉+ |1111〉). (2)
From Eqs.(1) and (2) we can calculate the inner product
of these two states
a1b1a2b2〈ϕ|ϕ〉a1a2b1b2 (3)
=
1
2
(〈0000|+ 〈0011|+ 〈1100|+ 〈1111|)
·1
2
(|0000〉+ |0101〉+ |1010〉+ |1111〉) = 1
2
.
Obviously, the two possible states are nonorthogonal and
Eve can never distinguish them determinately without
Alice’s classical information. When the two EPR pairs
are originally in other Bell states, we can obtain the
same conclusion by similar deduction. Therefore, in sub-
stance, the states transmitted in the quantum channel
are nonorthogonal and the mid protocol has the same
essence as that of BB84-type protocols.
From another point of view, we can recognize the sim-
ilarity between the mid protocol and BB84-type proto-
cols more clearly by reinterpreting the latter. That is,
Alice randomly prepares single photons polarized along
one of two possible directions, 0◦ or 90◦ (Note that
they are orthogonal states). Afterwards, Alice makes an
information-splitting operation which can be described
as follows. Alice performs, at random, one of the follow-
ing two operations on each photon: (1) doing nothing;
(2) rotating its polarized direction by 45◦ clockwise, that
is, changing its state into the corresponding one in the
other basis {45◦, 135◦}. After that the photon forms the
quantum part. While the classical part is 0 or 1, cor-
responding to the operation (1) or (2) respectively. At
the destination, when Bob received both the two parts,
he can recover and obtain the original information just
by a reverse operation and a measurement in the basis
{0◦, 90◦}. It can be seen that the carrier states are or-
thogonal (nonorthogonal) before (after) the information-
splitting operation, which is quite similar with that of
the mid protocol. In a word, the mid protocol is ac-
tually equivalent to BB84-type protocols (the difference
between them is their material carriers).
From above analysis we can draw a conclusion that
BB84-type protocols and two-step-type protocols are not
entirely opposite. Contrarily, they have the same essence,
i.e., information splitting. An orthogonal carrier or a
nonorthogonal carrier, which looks like the main differ-
ence between these two types of protocols, is not an im-
portant, even not a very explicit matter. Let us take
the mid protocol as our example (BB84-type protocols
have the same feature). As far as Eve is concerned, the
possible states of the carrier unit, which is the small-
est system she has to distinguish, are nonorthogonal.
But for Bob, the possible states that need to be distin-
guished are indeed orthogonal because Bob knows which
two particles were initially in a Bell state (or which ba-
sis was used when Alice prepared each photon in BB84-
type protocols) with the help of Alice’s classical infor-
mation. One may argue that the possible states of the
separate quantum parts in some two-step-type protocols
are not nonorthogonal. (For example, the quantum part
can be in mixed state, mostly in maximally mixed state
ρ = 1
2
(|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|) [5, 13, 21]. Non-maximally mixed
state is subtly employed to remove the need for random
timing tests in Ref.[7].) However, we can find that each
quantum part has a feature that Eve cannot elicit the
key information (i.e., the complete information) without
introducing disturbance, which is same as that of the
above so-called nonorthogonal states. Here we generally
call both of them “indistinguishable states”.
Before we conclude, it is worthwhile to inspect our so-
called “the same essence” of BB84-type protocols and
two-step-type protocols, which includes (1) the carrier
state, which contains the complete key information, is
split into two parts (two quantum parts or one quan-
tum part and one classical one) and they are sent one by
one to prevent Eve from simultaneously taking control
of both of them. As described in Fig. 1, if Eve wants to
access both two parts at the same time, she must send
fake particles or wave packets to Bob, which will be de-
tected by the legal communicators; (2) the possible states
of each quantum part are indistinguishable states, which
means that Eve cannot elicit useful information without
introducing errors. Of course, Eve cannot extract key in-
formation from the classical part, either; (3) anyone who
obtains both parts can recover the initial carrier state
and then distinguish it from several possible (orthogonal
or distinguishable) states. Namely, when Bob received
both two parts he can obtain the key information Al-
ice sent. In fact, the security of BB84-type protocols
and two-step-type protocols is just based on the above
essence.
Finally, we have to confess that there are still some
differences between BB84-type protocols and two-step-
type protocols. The main one is that the former splits
the information unit into a quantum part and a classical
one, while the latter splits it into two quantum parts. As
a consequence, Bob can guess the value of the classical
part (i.e., the one comes later) instead of waiting until its
arriving in BB84-type protocols. Equivalently, Bob ran-
4domly selects a basis to measure each photon and at last
the communicators discard the bits from those photons
that are prepared and measured in different bases, which
is just the idea of the original BB84 protocol [1] (this fea-
ture also applies to the mid protocol). On the contrary,
in two-step-type protocols the later part is a quantum
one and Bob cannot do such guesswork. It should be
emphasized that, however, this difference between these
two types of QKD protocols cannot cover up their same
essence described above.
To summarize, we have mainly discussed the relation
between BB84-type protocols and two-step-type ones.
By presenting a simple QKD scheme (i.e., the mid pro-
tocol) we take cognizance of some connections between
these two types of protocols and draw a conclusion that
they have the same essence as described above (see
Fig. 1). This result can help us to make clear the base of
some QKD protocols’ security. Furthermore, it is useful
for related scheme designing and security analyzing.
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